We propose a new secret sharing scheme realizing general access structures, which is based on unauthorized subsets. In the proposed scheme, we can select a subset of participants without restrictions and reduce the number of shares distributed to any participant who belongs to the selected subset.
Introduction
In 1979, Blakley and Shamir independently introduced the concept of secret sharing [1] , [2] . In Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme [1] , every group of k participants can recover the secret K, but no group of less than k participants can get any information about the secret from their shares. The collection of all authorized subsets of participants is called the access structure. A (k, n)threshold scheme can only realize particular access structures that contain all subsets of k or more participants. Secret sharing schemes realizing more general access structures than that of a threshold scheme were studied by numerous authors. Koyama proposed secret sharing schemes for multi-groups [3] . Simmons studied secret sharing schemes realizing multilevel access structures [4] , [5] . Subsequently, Tassa proposed a hierarchical threshold scheme [6] . Dijk generalized the vector space construction by Brickell [7] and proposed the linear construction [8] . Stinson proposed the decomposition construction [9] . These schemes obtain the optimal information rates for some access structures, but these schemes cannot be applied to many access structures or do not have explicit share assignment algorithms for many access structures.
On the other hand, Ito, Saito and Nishizeki proposed a secret sharing scheme for general access structures and showed an explicit share assignment algorithm for any access structure [10] . Secret sharing schemes which have an explicit assignment algorithm for any access structure are categorized by three types. One type is schemes based on unauthorized subsets [10] , [11] , [12] . Another type is schemes based on authorized subsets [13] , [14] , [15] . Yet another type is a scheme based on both unauthorized subsets and authorized subsets (IYO07) [16] .
In the implementation of secret sharing schemes for general 1 Department of Mathematical Information Engineering, College of Industrial Technology, Nihon University, Narashino, Chiba 275-8575, Japan a) tochikubo.kouya@nihon-u.ac.jp access structures, an important issue is the number of shares distributed to each participant. Obviously, a scheme constructed of small shares is desirable. However, in general, the proposed secret sharing schemes for general access structures are impractical in this respect when the size of the access structure is very large. Suppose that we want to apply secret sharing schemes to a company. Here, we consider a section which consists of two managers and 20 staff members. A secret can be recovered by a group of two managers or groups of one manager and two staff members. In this case, every manager belongs to 191 minimal authorized subsets and every staff member belongs to 38 minimal authorized subsets. We shall realize this access structure by applying Benaloh and Leichter's scheme [13] . Then, each manager has to hold 191 shares and each staff member has to hold 38 shares. In 2015, a new secret sharing scheme realizing general access structures was proposed (T15) [17] . This scheme is based on authorized subsets and the first scheme that can reduce the number of shares distributed to specified participants. In the scheme A of T15, we can select a subset of participants without restrictions and reduce the number of shares distributed to any participant who belongs to the selected subset. In the above case, by selecting two managers as a subset of participants we can reduce the number of shares distributed to each manager to 2 if we employ the scheme A of T15. Therefore, in secret sharing schemes reducing the numbers of shares distributed to specified participants is quite useful.
In this paper, we modify the scheme A of T08 [12] and the scheme A of T15 [17] and propose a new secret sharing scheme realizing general access structures, which is based on the unauthorized subsets and can reduce the number of shares distributed to specified participants. Thus, we can select a subset of participants without restrictions and reduce the number of shares distributed to any participant who belongs to the selected subset as well as the scheme A of T15. In the above case, by selecting two managers as a subset of participants we can also reduce the numc 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan ber of shares distributed to each manager to 2, if we employ our proposed scheme.
Preliminaries

Secret Sharing Scheme
Let P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n } be a set of n participants. Let D( P) denote a dealer who selects a secret and distribute a share to each participant. Let K and S denote a secret set and a share set, respectively. S(A) denotes the shares assigned to a subset A ⊂ P. The access structure Γ(⊂ 2 P ) is the family of subsets of P which contains the sets of participants qualified to recover the secret. For any authorized subset A ∈ Γ, any superset of A is also an authorized subset. Hence, the access structure should satisfy the monotone property:
Let Γ 0 be a family of the minimal sets in Γ, called the minimal access structure. Γ 0 is denoted by
For any access structure Γ, there is a family of setsΓ = 2 P − Γ.
Here,Γ contains the sets of participants unqualified to recover the secret. The family of maximal sets inΓ is denoted byΓ 1 . That is,
Let p K be a probability distribution on K. Let p S(A) be a probability distribution on the shares S(A). Usually a secret K is chosen from K with the uniform distribution. A secret sharing scheme is perfect if
where H(K) and H(K|A) denote the entropy of p K and the conditional entropy defined by the joint probability distribution p K×S(A) , respectively.
In general, the efficiency of a perfect secret sharing scheme is measured by the information rate ρ [18] defined as
where S(P i ) denotes the set of possible shares that P i might receive. ρ i is the information rate for P i . Obviously, a high information rate is desirable. A perfect secret sharing scheme is ideal if ρ = 1.
Shamir's (k, n)-threshold Scheme
Throughout the paper, p is a large prime, and let Z p be a finite field with p elements. Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme is described as follows [1]: ( 1 ) A dealer D chooses n distinct nonzero elements of Z p , denoted by x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n . The values x i are public. ( 2 ) Suppose D wants to share a secret K ∈ Z p , D chooses k − 1 elements a 1 , a 2 , · · · a k−1 from Z p independently with a uniform distribution.
is a polynomial over Z p . It is known that Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme is perfect and ideal [18] , [19] . This implies that every group of k participants can recover the secret K, but no group of less than k participants can get any information about the secret.
The access structure of (k, n)-threshold scheme is described as follows:
In this paper, every share is computed by using Shamir's (k, n)threshold scheme though any ideal threshold scheme can be used instead of Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme for k n, and more simple schemes can be used instead of Shamir's (n, n)-threshold scheme. Therefore, we assume K = S = Z p .
Secret Sharing Schemes Based on Authorized Subsets
For P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }, K ∈ K and Γ, Benaloh and Leichter's scheme [13] is described as follows.
Benaloh and Leichter's scheme (BL88):
by using an (|A i |, |A i |)-threshold scheme with K as a secret independently for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
( 2 ) One distinct share from
is assigned to each P ∈ A i (1 ≤ i ≤ m). Example 1: For P = {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 }, consider the following access structure
We shall realize this access structure by Benaloh and Leichter's scheme. In this case, shares are distributed as follows: where s i, j is computed by using Shamir's (|A i |, |A i |)-threshold scheme with K as a secret (1 ≤ i ≤ 6, 1 ≤ j ≤ |A i |).
For P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }, Q(⊂ P), K ∈ K and Γ, the scheme A c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan of T15 [17] is described as follows. Scheme A of T15:
and represent it as
We shall realize the access structure of Example 1 by the proposed scheme A of T15.
• Since Q = {P 1 , P 2 }, A is defined by
• A 1 , A 2 and A 3 are defined by
by using Shamir's (2, 2)-threshold scheme with K as a secret independently. Since C 3 = φ, we set We can select a subset of participants Q(⊂ P) without restrictions. This scheme can reduce the number of shares distributed to each participant P ∈ Q. On the other hand, for any P ∈ P − Q, the number of shares distributed to P is equal to that of Benaloh and Leichter's scheme.
Secret Sharing Schemes Based on Unauthorized Subsets
For P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }, K ∈ K and Γ, Ito, Saito and Nishizeki's scheme [10] is described as follows.
Ito, Saito and Nishizeki's Scheme (ISN87):
for the secret K by using a (t, t)-threshold scheme.
( 2 ) Distribute shares to P i ∈ P (1 ≤ i ≤ n) according to the function g : P → 2 S defined as
Example 3:
We shall realize the access structure of Example 1 by Ito, Saito and Nishizeki's scheme. For this access structure,Γ 1 is given bȳ
( 1 ) Since |Γ 1 | = 12, compute 12 shares
by using a (12, 12)-threshold scheme for the secret K.
( 2 ) According to the function g, distribute shares as follows:
For P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }, K ∈ K and Γ, the scheme A of T08 [12] is described as follows. Scheme A of T08:
( 1 ) DivideΓ 1 into disjoint subsets
Let d = Γ (0) 1 and representΓ (0) 1 , e i (1 ≤ i ≤ r) and Y i (1 ≤ i ≤ r) as
and
respectively.
( 2 ) Compute d + r shares S = {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s d+r } for the secret K by using Shamir's (d + r, d + r)-threshold scheme.
( 3 ) If r > 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, by using Shamir's (e i − |Z i | + 1, |Y i |)threshold scheme with s d+i as a secret, compute |Y i | shares
independently for 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
( 4 ) Distribute shares to P i ∈ P (1 ≤ i ≤ n) according to the function defined as
Example 4:
We shall realize the access structure of Example 1 by the scheme A of T08.
• DivideΓ 1 into disjoint subsets This scheme can reduce the number of shares distributed to P Z i (1 ≤ i ≤ r). Thus, for any access structure, this scheme is more efficient than the scheme proposed by Ito, Saito and Nishizeki [10] from the viewpoint of the number of shares distributed to each participant.
Remarks In the scheme A of T08,Γ (1) 1 , · · · ,Γ (r) 1 cannot be determined uniquely. When we select a large r, we can reduce the number of shares distributed to each participant though it is hard to find r. Of course, if we can choose r = 0, then this scheme is equivalent to Ito, Saito and Nishizeki's scheme and shares are distributed to each participant uniquely.
Proposed Scheme
Here, we modify the scheme A of T08 [12] and the scheme A of T15 [17] and propose a new secret sharing scheme realizing general access structures. The proposed scheme can reduce the number of shares distributed to P ∈ Q(⊂ P) by dividing Γ 0 according to the subsets of Q in the same way as the scheme A of T15 (Γ 0 dividing phase). Furthermore, in order to reduce the number of shares distributed to each participant P ∈ P − Q the scheme A of T08 is applied to each divided access structure in the proposed scheme (secret sharing phase for divided access structures). For P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }, Q(⊂ P), K ∈ K and Γ, the proposed scheme is described as follows. Proposed Scheme: (Γ 0 dividing phase) ( 1 ) Let A = {C ⊂ Q : Q ∩ A = C for some A ∈ Γ 0 } and represent it as
( 2 ) For C j ∈ A , let
and B ∪ C j = A for some A ∈ Γ 0 } and represent it as
(iii) if C j φ and A j {φ} then compute 2 shares S j = {w j , w j } by using Shamir's (2, 2)-threshold scheme with K as a secret independently for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
, · · · , s j, j|C j | } by using Shamir's (|C j |, |C j |)-threshold scheme with w j as a secret independently for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. (Secret sharing phase for divided access structures) (5) LetΓ 1, j be the family of maximal unauthorized subsets for P − Q and the minimal access structure A j (1 ≤ j ≤ m).
(i) DivideΓ 1, j into disjoint subsets
for some Y j,i ⊂ P − Q and Z j,i ⊂ P − Q(Y j,i ∩ Z j,i = φ) and
Let d j = Γ (0) 1, j and representΓ (0) 1, j , e j,i (1 ≤ i ≤ r j ) and Y j,i (1 ≤ i ≤ r j ) as
and Y j,i = {P j,i1 , P j,i2 , · · · , P j,i|Y j,i | }, c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan respectively.
(ii) Compute d j + r j shares S j = {s j,1 , s j,2 , · · · , s j,d j +r j } for the secret w j by using Shamir's (d j + r j , d j + r j )threshold scheme.
(iii) If r j > 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r j , by using Shamir's (e j,i − |Z j,i | + 1, |Y j,i |)-threshold scheme with s j,d j +i as a secret, compute |Y j,i | shares S j,d j +i = {s j,d j +i,i1 , s j,d j +i,i2 , · · · , s j,d j +i,i|Y j,i | }, independently for 1 ≤ i ≤ r j . (6) Distribute shares to P i ∈ P (1 ≤ i ≤ n) according to the function defined as
Example 5: Let Q = {P 1 , P 2 }. We shall realize the access structure of Example 1 by the proposed scheme.
• For C 1 , C 2 ∈ A , compute 2 shares
by using Shamir's (2, 2)-threshold scheme with K as a secret independently. Since C 3 = φ, we set S 3 = {w 3 } and w 3 = K.
• For C 1 , C 2 ∈ A , compute |C j | shares S 1,1 = {s 1,1 , s 1,2 },
by using (|C j |, |C j |)-threshold scheme with w j as a secret independently for 1 ≤ j ≤ 2. (Secret sharing phase for A 1 )
• For {P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 }(= P − Q) and A 1 ,Γ 1,1 is given bȳ
• DivideΓ 1,1 into disjoint subsets
• Since d 1 = 0 and r 1 = 2, compute 2 shares
for the secret w 1 by using Shamir's (2, 2)-threshold scheme. • Since d 2 = 1 and r 2 = 1, compute 2 shares
for the secret w 2 by using Shamir's (2, 2)-threshold scheme.
• Since r 2 > 0, by using Shamir's (e 2,1 − |Z 2,1 | + 1, |Y 2,1 |)threshold scheme with s 2,2 as a secret, compute S 2,2 as follows:
(Secret sharing phase for A 3 )
• Similarly, for {P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 } and A 3 ,Γ 1,3 is given bȳ Γ 1,3 = {{P 3 , P 4 , P 5 }, {P 3 , P 4 , P 6 }, {P 3 , P 5 , P 6 }, {P 4 , P 5 , P 6 }}.
• In this case, we set r 3 = 0 andΓ (0) We can select a subset of participants Q(⊂ P) without restriction. In this example, we select a subset of participants Q = {P 1 , P 2 }. The proposed scheme can reduce the number of shares distributed to P ∈ Q by dividing Γ 0 into A 1 , A 2 , A 3 according to the subsets of Q. Furthermore, in order to reduce the number of shares distributed to each participant P ∈ P − Q the scheme A of T08 is applied to divided access structures A 1 , A 2 , A 3 . Here, we show some properties of the proposed scheme.
Theorem 1 Let P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n } be a set of n participants. For any Q(⊂ P) and any access structure Γ(⊂ 2 P ), distribute shares for a secret K by using the proposed scheme. Then, for any subset X ⊂ P, (a) X ∈ Γ ⇒ H(K|X) = 0, (b) X Γ ⇒ H(K|X) = H(K). Proof: Let X S 1, j denote the shares in S 1, j assigned to X (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Let X S j be a set of shares in S j which are assigned to X or can be recovered by X (1 ≤ j ≤ m) . At first, we show H(K|X) = 0 for any X ∈ Γ. From the property of the access structure and the definition of A 1 , · · · , A m and A , there exists A ∈ Γ 0 such that
Since C ji is an authorized subset for A j , we have |X S j | = d j + r j from the definition of S j , S j,d j +1 , · · · , S j,d j +r j and Theorem 1 of T08 [12] . Thus, X can recover w j since s j,1 , s j,2 , · · · , s j,d j +r j are shares computed by Shamir's (d j + r j , d j + r j )-threshold scheme with w j as a secret. On the other hand, we have
If C j φ, then X can recover w j since s j, j1 , s j, j2 , · · · , s j, j |C j | are shares computed by Shamir's (|C j |, |C j |)-threshold scheme with w j as a secret. From the definition of S j , we immediately obtain
Since H(K|X) ≥ 0 is obvious, we have H(K|X) = 0 for any X ∈ Γ.
Next we show H(K|X) = H(K) for any X Γ. From the property of the access structure and the definition of A 1 , · · · , A m and A , for any A ∈ Γ 0 , we have
Thus, from the definition of S j , S j,d j +1 , · · · , S j,d j +r j and Theorem 1 of T08, we have
In order to show H(K|X) = H(K), we expand H(K|X) as follows:
= H(K) + H(X S 1,1 , · · · , X S 1,m , X S 1 , · · · , X S m |K) −H(X S 1,1 , · · · , X S 1,m , X S 1 , · · · , X S m ).
From the chain rule for entropy, we have H(X S 1,1 , · · · , X S 1,m , X S 1 , · · · , X S m |K) = m t=1 H(X S 1,t , X S t |K, X S 1,1 , · · · · · · , X S 1,t−1 , X S 1 , · · · , X S t−1 )
Here, ( * ) comes from the fact that X S 1,1 , · · · , X S 1,m and X S 1 , · · · , X S m are mutually independent and the last equality comes from Eq. (7) . On the other hand, we have
Substituting Eqs. (9) and (10) 
Evaluation of the Efficiency
The information rates for P i ∈ P for the access structure of Example 1 are described in Table 1 .
This result shows that the scheme A of T15 and the proposed scheme can reduce the number of shares distributed to P ∈ Q. In general, we can improve the information rate when we select participants who are assigned the most shares. It is noted that we can select a subset of participants Q without restrictions in the proposed scheme.
From Eq. (6) and the fact that s j,d j +k or s j,d j +k,i are assigned to
, |g (P)| is evaluated as follows:
On the other hand, let N T 15A (P) be the number of shares distributed to P ∈ P by using the scheme A of T15. Then, we have
Equations (11) and (12) show that the efficiencies of the scheme A of T15 and the proposed scheme are equal for P ∈ Q and the efficiencies depend on the access structure for P ∈ P − Q.
Here, we show two examples in order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed scheme. Example 6: For P = {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 }, consider the following access structure Γ 0 = {{P 1 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 }, {P 1 , P 3 , P 5 , P 6 }, {P 1 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 }, {P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 }, {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 }, {P 2 , P 3 , P 4 }, {P 1 , P 2 , P 5 }, {P 2 , P 3 , P 5 }, {P 2 , P 4 , P 5 }, {P 1 , P 2 , P 6 }, {P 2 , P 3 , P 6 }, {P 2 , P 4 , P 6 }, {P 2 , P 5 , P 6 }}.
For this access structure,Γ 1 is given bȳ
We shall realize the access structure Γ 0 by schemes which have an explicit assignment algorithm for any access structure. The information rates for P i ∈ P are described in Table 2 . Table 2 shows that IYO07 and the proposed scheme obtain the best information rate in this example. It is noted that the proposed scheme obtains the best information rate even if the efficiency with respect to Q is discussed. The scheme A of T15 and the proposed scheme can reduce the number of shares distributed to P ∈ Q. Of course, the efficiencies depend on the access structure for P ∈ P − Q. Example 7: For P = {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 }, consider the following access structure It is known that the optimal information rate for Γ 0 is 2/3, which is obtained when we employ the linear construction. As mentioned above, the linear construction obtains the optimal information rates for some access structures, but this scheme does not have explicit share assignment algorithms for many access structures. The information rates for P i ∈ P are described in Table 3 . Table 3 shows that the proposed scheme can reduce the number of shares distributed to P ∈ Q = {P 1 , P 5 } though the proposed scheme cannot obtain the optimal information rate.
Conclusion
We have proposed a new secret sharing scheme realizing general access structures. Our proposed scheme is perfect and can reduce the number of shares distributed to specified participants. Thus, we can select a subset of participants without restrictions and reduce the number of shares distributed to any participant who belongs to the selected subset as well as the scheme A of T15. The scheme A of T15 is based on authorized subsets. On the other hand, our proposed scheme is based on unauthorized subsets.
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